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  The purpose of this paper is to compare the interaction between pricing and 
capacity decisions on simple serial and parallel transport networks. When individual 
links of the network are operated by different regional or national authorities, toll and 
capacity competition is likely to result. Moreover, the problem is potentially 
complicated by the presence of both local and transit demand on each link of the 
network. We bring together and extend the recent literature on the topic and, using 
both theory and numerical simulation techniques, provide a careful comparison of toll 
and capacity interaction on serial and parallel network structures. First, we show that 
there is more tax exporting in serial transport corridors than on competing parallel 
road networks. Second, the inability to toll transit has quite dramatic negative welfare 
effects on parallel networks. On the contrary, in serial transport corridors it may 
actually be undesirable to allow the tolling of transit at all. Third, if the links are 
exclusively used by transit transport, toll and capacity decisions are independent in 
serial networks. This does not generally hold in the presence of local transport. 
Moreover, it contrasts with a parallel setting where regional authorities compete for 
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1. Introduction 
  Congestion is a serious problem in many countries worldwide. Apart from a 
variety of other measures, economists have long advocated the use of pricing policies 
to tackle this problem. Moreover, it has been recognized that in the long-run pricing 
can be accompanied by investment strategies to alleviate congestion. However, 
implementing pricing and investment policies on realistic transport networks leads to 
a number of potential complications. First, since different links (highways, roads, 
railroads,,..) of a network may be under the jurisdiction of different governments and 
most links are used both by local transport and by through traffic (transit), the fear 
exists that competition for transit toll revenues may induce governments or operators 
to exploit transit transport by imposing high tolls. Second, governments may 
strategically invest to capture transit toll revenues. Third, when tolling transit is for 
some reason not feasible, regions may be reluctant to invest in capacity because the 
benefits accrue to a significant extent to foreigners. In sum, the possibility of strategic 
behaviour by governments and the interaction of local and transit transport raises a 
number of questions about toll and capacity choices on transport networks: (i) How 
does investment in infrastructure capacity affect the pricing behaviour of 
governments; (ii) What are the welfare effects of toll and capacity competition for 
transit; (iii) To what extent do the outcomes of this competition between governments 
depend on the structure of the transport network.  
  The purpose of this paper is to study the interaction between pricing and 
capacity decisions on simple networks, where individual links of the network are 
operated by different governments. We do so by bringing together and extending the 
recent literature on the topic. As real-world networks are highly complex, we focus in 
this paper on two extreme network structures. Both are highly simplified 
representations of realistic networks, but they capture the main ingredients of the 
interactions between local and transit traffic for joint toll and capacity competition 
between regions. The first one is a parallel network structure in which long distance 
transit traffic has a choice between different jurisdictions’ networks. For example, 
there are two main routes from South-Central Europe (Switzerland, Austria, Italy) to 
the north (Belgium, Netherlands, etc.), one through France, the other via Germany.  
Another example is the transalpine crossing between Germany and Italy, where the 
main links pass either through Austria or through Switzerland. In both examples,   2
transit has a choice of routes and it interacts with local traffic in each country. Note 
that, with minor adjustments, the choice between two modes that connect a given 
origin and destination fits within this framework as well. For example, freight 
connections between ports such as Antwerp or Rotterdam and the Ruhr in Germany 
have a choice between road, rail or inland waterways. Some transport between 
Finland and Germany has the choice between shipping (through Kiel) and road modes 
(via Sweden and Denmark).  
  The second network structure we consider is a serial transport corridor, which 
provides a more realistic representation of many road and rail sytems.  Both the Trans 
European Networks (basically a border-crossing rail and highway system) in Europe 
and the interstate highway system in the US fit this setting of serial transport 
corridors. Moreover, a serial setting applies to inter-modal freight trips where the 
transfer facility (ports, airports, freight terminal) and the upstream or downstream 
infrastructure is controlled by different governments. The possibility of strategic 
behaviour in the case of a serial corridor has been noted several times before. In the 
case of railroads, for example,  EU Directive 2001/14 has explicitly argued that 
coordination between countries is needed in order to avoid the negative effects of the 
lack of harmonisation of different charging systems used by member states. 
Moreover, Nash (2005) finds some evidence of tax exporting behaviour in an analysis 
of European infrastructure charges.   
  The issue of optimal pricing and investment decisions on simple transport 
networks has been studied before. First, various studies have considered parallel 
network structures. For example, different aspects of pricing of congestible parallel 
roads have been studied by, e.g., Braid (1986), Verhoef et al. (1996), De Palma and 
Lindsey (2000), McDonald and Liu (1999), Small and Yan (2001), and Van Dender 
(2005). As far as we know, the only study to analyze the problem within the context 
of toll competition between governments is De Borger, Proost and Van Dender 
(2005); they do so for fixed capacity, however. Both De Palma and Leruth (1989) and 
De Borger and Van Dender (2006) study two-stage games in capacities and prices for 
congested facilities, but they do not consider the interaction between local and transit 
traffic and they do not look at issues of tax and capacity competition. Second, several 
studies address strategic behaviour in serial transport corridors. One study looks 
specifically at tax exporting in such a setting, but ignores capacity decisions 
(Levinson (2001)). More recently, De Borger, Dunkerley and Proost (2006a) do   3
consider pricing and capacity investment in a two-stage game for a serial network, 
and illustrate the welfare effects for various sets of tolling instruments. Finally, 
Bassanini and Pouyet (2005) study the non-coorperative choice of financing system 
(i.e., does the system allow subsidies to be paid out of general tax revenues) by two 
national infrastructure managers who maximize welfare in their country while 
covering network costs. Agrell and Pouyet (2006) extend this work, focusing on 
countries’ incentives to improve investment efficiency.  
  In this paper, we extend and integrate earlier findings on tax and capacity 
games between welfare maximising governments in both serial and parallel networks. 
Although some of the results of the current paper have been reported separately in 
some of the studies referred to above, our focus here is on the differences in the nature 
and extent of toll and capacity competition between regions, depending on the 
structure of the network. The comparison between serial and parallel networks 
discussed and numerically illustrated in this paper yields several new insights that 
have important policy implications. In both types of network structure, fiscal and 
expenditure externalities give rise to strategic pricing and investment behaviour by the 
various governments involved. However, the Nash equilibrium tolls and capacity 
levels differ drastically between network settings and the welfare implications of 
particular policies are sometimes diametrically opposed. For example, the desirability 
of taxing transit at all is highly dependent on the network structure. Throughout, we 
assume that countries maximise a welfare function consisting of local consumer 
surplus and tax revenues from local and transit traffic, and we study strategic tolling 
by individual countries under various tolling schemes. First, we assume that local 
traffic and transit can be tolled separately. Second, we look at the case where only 
uniform tolls are possible or acceptable.  Third, we consider the case where only local 
traffic can be tolled. 
  The results of this paper include the following. First, if the network were 
exclusively used by transit transport, we show that toll and capacity decisions are 
independent in serial networks; in a parallel setting, however, it is shown that extra 
investment in capacity in a given region leads to lower Nash equilibrium tolls in both 
regions. The former result does not generalize to a setting with both local and transit 
demand, the latter does. Second, the nature and extent of competition in capacity and 
tolls differs strongly between network types. For example, in absolute values reaction 
functions for transit tolls are much more responsive to tolls abroad on serial than on   4
parallel networks. The policy implication of this finding is that, ceteris paribus, one 
expects much more tax exporting behaviour, and hence higher toll levels, in serial 
transport corridors than on competing parallel road networks. Third, the inability to 
toll transit has quite dramatic negative welfare effects on parallel networks, partly 
because it strongly reduces the incentives to invest. On the contrary, in serial transport 
corridors it may actually be undesirable to toll transit. Again, this has a clear policy 
implication. It implies that it may not be wise for the EU to allow individual countries 
to independently decide on toll levels on transit traffic that passes through their 
jurisdiction. 
  The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the notation, 
the networks analyzed and the model used. We then look at the simplified case of zero 
local demand to get some preliminary intuition on the problem of competition for 
transit in serial and parallel settings (Section 3). Theoretical results obtained for the 
more general case with local and transit demand are summarized in Section 4. 
Numerical illustrations and a careful comparison of the welfare effects of tax and 
capacity competition in different networks are given in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 
offers some tentative policy conclusions. 
 
2. Model description 
  The models we used for the study of tax competition on simple transport 
networks can be summarized as follows. First, two very stylized types of network 
structure have been considered; they are illustrated on Figure 1. As argued in the 
introduction, we distinguish parallel and serial network structures as very simple 
descriptions of real-world toll and capacity competition problems. The first case arises 
when different parallel links can be used to make a particular trip; each link is used by 
both local traffic and transit traffic (through traffic) and is operated by a different 
authority (say, a government). Moreover, transit traffic has a choice between the 
different parallel links, so that governments compete for transit tax revenues. The 
second prototype network arises when transit has to use a route that sequentially runs 
through the territory of different governments. The existence of these ‘transport 
corridors’ leads to a different type of tax competition: transit no longer has any route 
choice, but the same transit traffic may sequentially be taxed by each of the   5
governments operating the serial links. Note that in the two network types origins and 
destinations are assumed to lie outside the network.   
 
Figure 1 Parallel (upper part) versus serial (lower part) competition 
 
  We assume that governments are interested in maximizing a (local) social 
welfare function that reflects two concerns, viz. (i) the travel conditions of its local 
users and the associated welfare, and (ii) total tax revenues on the link it controls. The 
assumption that transit traffic has its origin and destination outside the two-link 
network implies that the two governments are not interested in the transport costs and 
the welfare of transit. Finally, we assume that all traffic flows are uniformly 
distributed over time and are equal in both directions, allowing us to focus on one 
representative unit period and one direction.                                                                   
  To model both parallel and serial settings, we proceed as follows. We denote 
the network links running through the territory of governments A and B by 
appropriate subscripts. We assume each link carries local traffic and transit traffic. 
Local traffic uses only the local link. Transit traffic chooses one of the links (parallel 
case) or passes through the two links. The capacity of each link can be augmented 
through investments; however, once capacity is chosen for a given link it is 
potentially congestible.  
  Demand for local transport in regions A and B is represented by the strictly 
downward sloping and twice differentiable inverse demand functions  ( )
Y
AA PY and 
()
Y
BB PY, respectively, where  A Y  and  B Y  are the local flows on both links. As is 
common in the transport literature, the prices  (.)
j
i P  are generalised prices including 
Country A
Country B
















Destination   6
resource costs, time costs and toll payments. Similarly, overall demand for transit 
traffic is described by the strictly downward sloping inverse demand function ( )
X PX , 
where X is the transit traffic flow. Importantly, the treatment of transit differs for 
parallel and serial settings. We have the following definitions:  
   P a r a l l e l   l i n k s   A B X XX = +  
   S e r i a l   l i n k s   A B X XX = =  
In the case of parallel links, total demand for transit is ‘distributed’ over the two 
alternatives; with serial links, all transit passes through both regions A and B. 
  We now turn to the cost side. Although other tolling regimes will be 
considered (see below), here we formulate cost functions for the case of differentiated 
tolls between local transport and transit traffic. In that case, the generalised user cost 
functions for local use of links A and B are given by, respectively: 
  ()
Y
A AA A A gC V Rt = + . 
 ()
Y
BB B B B gC V Rt = + . 
Here, the  (.) i C  are the time plus resource costs on link i, and  i R  is the inverse of 
capacity. The user cost function is twice differentiable and strictly increasing in  ii VR, 
the total traffic volume relative to capacity. Making time costs a function of volume-
capacity ratio is a common practice in transport economics (see, e.g., Verhoef et al. 
(1996)). The  i t  are the tolls on local transport. Similarly, the generalised user cost for 
transit through region i (i=A,B), denoted as
X
i g , equals the sum of the time and 
resource costs of travel plus the transit tolls, denoted  i τ , in both  A and B:  




A AA A A
X








  The transport user equilibrium is defined by equating generalized prices and 
generalized costs. In the parallel case, it is assumed that from the viewpoint of transit 
the two routes are perfect substitutes; moreover, we focus on internal solutions 
throughout, i.e., we exclude the case where one link is not used at all. Under those 
conditions the transport user equilibria for the serial and parallel networks can be 
summarized as follows:                               7
 
Serial network   ( )
YY
A AA PY g =          
    ()
YY
BB B PY g =         ( 1 )
    ( )
XX X
A B PX g g =+ 
 
Parallel network  ( )
YY
A AA PY g =          
    ()
YY
BB B PY g =         ( 2 )  
     ( )
XX X
A B PX g g ==            
            
The user equilibrium requires generalized prices and generalized cost to be equal for 
all traffic types. The equilibrium conditions (1) and (2) can be solved for the demands 
for local and transit traffic as a function of taxes and capacities in both countries. In 
the case of a serial network structure, solving (1) and using the definitions of the 
generalized user costs given before, yields the demand functions
1: 
  
(,, , , ) , (,, , , )
(,, , , )
rr
A AB A B A B B AB A B A B
r
AB A B A B







Similarly, solving (2) implies demand functions: 
  
( ,,,,,) , ( ,,,,,)
( ,,,,,) , ( ,,,,,)
rr
AABAB A B BABAB A B
rr
AAB A B A B BAB A B A B
Ytt RR Ytt RR




Note the difference. The serial structure implies demands that depend on local tolls 
and on the total toll paid by transit. The parallel structure has demands that depend on 
local tolls and on the individual tolls for transit in A and B.   
  As argued above, the analysis of tax and capacity competition is studied for 
several tax regimes. They are summarized in Table 2. We distinguish between:  
 
(i)  Different tolls on local and transit traffic; this is the case explained above, 
where  we used  i τ and  i t  for the toll on transit and local demand in region 
i, respectively (i=A,B).  
                                                 
1 These are “reduced” demand functions indicated with a superscript r where the effects of government 
control parameters (tolls and capacity) on the congestion levels via transit and local demands are 
integrated.   8
(ii)  Uniform tolls on local and transit transport. Uniform tolls are denoted 
ii i t θ τ == . 






Toll differentiation   Local users are tolled differently than transit users  
Uniform toll   Local users and transit users pay the same toll  
Local traffic only   Only local users are tolled  
Table 2: Different types of tolling 
2 
 
  Finally, except otherwise noted, we assume that the governments are 
interested in maximizing a welfare function that consists of the consumer surplus for 
its local users plus all tax revenues generated on local and transit demand, net of 
investment costs associated with capacity provision. As an example, in the case of 







AA A A A A A A
A
WP y d y g Y t Y X K
R
τ =− + + − ∫     (3) 
where  A K  is the unit cost of capacity expansion. This specification implies that we 
assume constant returns to scale in capacity extension throughout. Note that the same 
objective function is used for serial and parallel networks. The difference is situated in 
the demand functions (see above). Finally, note that its generalisation to the cases of 
uniform tolls or local tolls only is obvious.   
 
3. Toll and capacity competition in parallel and serial networks: the 
case of zero local demand.  
  To set the stage for the more general tax and capacity competition on simple 
transport networks, we start the analysis by considering a simplified case, viz. the case 
of zero local transport. In that case, there is no interaction between local and transit 
traffic, and the complexity of tolling and capacity interaction between regions is 
                                                 
2 Note that the three types of tolling regimes have potential policy relevance in a federal structure such 
as, e.g., the European Union. For discussion of the tolling regimes, see De Borger, Proost and Van 
Dender (2005).    9
easier to analyze. Moreover, to analyze the two-stage Nash game it will be instructive 
to introduce simple functional forms for demand and cost functions
3. Specifically, we 
assume all demand and cost functions are linear. Demands are given by:  




,, , , , 0
X
Y
AA A A A
Y
BB B B B
AA BB
PX a b X
PY c d Y
PY c d Y





                                                  





A AA A A A












Note that demands and costs are linear in generalized prices and volume-capacity 
ratios, respectively. In the zero local demand case  0 AB YY = = . 
  Despite its simplicity, the analysis in this section is useful to get some 
preliminary insights. Some of these are interesting in their own right, and they have 
not been derived in the literature before. It highlights the crucial role of the network 
structure for toll and capacity competition. We first deal with the serial case, then 
study the parallel one. Surprisingly, in the former case there is a simple closed form 
solution where pricing and capacity Nash equilibria are in fact totally independent. On 
the contrary, in the parallel case even the simple problem modelled here generates 
complex interactions between the capacity and pricing stage of the game, and it 
implies the possibility of multiple equilibria at the capacity stage. These findings will 
be useful to interpret the more general cases with both local and transit transport, as 
discussed later in the paper (see Section 4).   
  
3.1. Zero local demand: the serial case 
 
  Consider the simple case where there is no local transport on either of the two 
serial links. In fact, this may have some policy-relevance for small countries, where 
local transport on part of the network is almost negligible (e.g., the highway passing 
through Luxemburg; some rail connections). Under those conditions, noting that 
                                                 
3 Note that these specifications will be used for all tax regimes considered as well, see below.    10
transit demand is by definition equal in both regions, the cost functions for transport 
time (and resources) in regions A and B reduce to: 












Using the equilibrium conditions for transit we then easily show that the reduced form 
transit demand (i.e., the demand for transit as a function of tolls and capacities in both 
regions) is given by: 
   
() r A BA B a
X
N
α ατ τ −− −−
= , where  A AB B Nb R R β β = ++   (4) 
  Note that the objective in this simplified case consists of maximizing the 
transit tax revenues minus capacity costs for each region by an appropriate choice of 
tax and capacity. Indeed, if local demand is zero, the objective function (3) for region 
A reduces to: 






τ =−  
We solve the two-stage price-capacity game by backwards induction. First consider 
the pricing game for given capacities. The first-order condition with respect to the 
price in region A is: 












  Solving for the tax rate in A immediately yields: 
    ( ) AA A B B R Xb R X τ ββ =+ +  
Note that  AA R X β  can be interpreted as the marginal external cost of congestion in 
region A. Then the optimal pricing rule (5) shows that the toll always exceeds the 
local marginal external cost. In fact, it implies more than that: the toll in region A 
covers more than the marginal external congestion cost in A plus the one in B. This 
phenomenon is similar to the issue of double marginalization in industrial 
organization (Tirole (1993)), Bresnahan and Reiss (1985)). It suggests that one 
expects relatively high tolls on transit in serial networks. Importantly, also note 
another implication. The optimal toll in A is equally affected by congestion in A and 
B: the effect of an exogenous increase in  AA R X β  is the same as for an increase 
in BB R X β . This follows from the serial network setting. Higher congestion in either A   11
or B raises the generalized cost of the complete trip and hence has the same effect on 
transit demand. It therefore triggers the same price response in a given region.   
  Substituting the expression derived for 
r X , equation (4), in the toll rule (5) 
and solving for the tax reaction function, we find: 








=−       ( 6 )  
Two issues stand out. First, the reaction function is downward sloping in the toll 
charged by the other region. In particular, it implies that if one region raises its toll by 
one euro, then the overall toll on the whole trajectory increases by precisely 0.5 euro. 
This is a well known result in the vertical integration literature in industrial 
organization, where a cost increase at the downstream level is only partially reflected 
in final output prices. Second and surprisingly, note that the reaction function is 
independent of capacities and of congestion: it neither depends on the i R , nor on 
the i β . The reason is that regional congestion affects the toll in both regions equally; 
as a consequence, it does not affect the interaction in tolling behavior between the two 
regions.     
  Using the analogous expression for the tax rate in B and solving for the Nash 
equilibrium yields: 
   
3





==       ( 7 )  
The structure of this Nash equilibrium closely resembles the standard private duopoly 
result (Tirole (1993)). It shows that the standard ‘double marginalization’ result still 
holds in the presence of congestion. Moreover, it has powerful implications. It means 
that the only Nash equilibrium in tolls: (i) is symmetric, even if the free-flow cost 
parameters differ; (ii) is independent of capacities, and (iii) is independent of the slope 
of the congestion function, so that tolls are not used to control local congestion.   
  We now proceed to the first stage of the game, i.e., the game in capacities. The 
first order condition for optimal capacity choice in region A is: 













      ( 8 )  
The second term on the right hand side equals zero, because the taxes are independent 
of capacities. Working out the derivative of expression (4) with respect to inverse   12



















  (9) 
This implicit function  ( , ) 0 AB RR ψ =  defines the reaction function of capacity in A 
with respect to capacity in B.  Using the implicit function theorem, the slope of the 
reaction function can be written as, after simple algebra:  















   ∂+ − − −    =− −
 ∂   ++   
         (10) 
where 
A R ψ <0 by the second order conditions for optimal capacity choice. It then 
follows that, given optimal taxes, the reaction functions are unambiguously positively 
sloped. To see this, it suffices to use the Nash equilibrium tax expressions derived 
above, so that  ( ) A BA B a τ τα α +−−− <0 follows.  
  Positively sloped capacity reaction functions make sense: optimal capacity 
choice by A implies equality between marginal capacity costs and marginal revenue 
of capacity expansion. Now consider an increase in capacity in B. This certainly 
raises transit demand and hence (since taxes are independent of capacity) tax revenues 
in A. More importantly, however, given the demand function for transit derived 
above, it easily follows that the capacity change in B also raises the marginal revenue 
from an expansion at A. Given the constant marginal cost of capacity expansion, the 
increase in marginal revenue justifies a capacity expansion. 
 
3.2. Zero local demand: the parallel case 
 
  The parallel case for zero local demand has been studied for revenue 
maximizing authorities by De Borger and Van Dender (2006) and De Palma and 
Proost (2006), although they do so in a somewhat different setting of competition 
between congestible private facilities. In our setting, cost functions for transport time 
(and resources) in regions A and B reduce to: 
   
()
()
A AA A A A







   13
Noting that  A B X XX =+ the equilibrium conditions can be solved for the demand 
functions for transit via A and B, respectively. We find: 
   []
1
() ( ) ()
r
AA A B B B B Xa b R b a
M
α τβ α τ =− − +− − −                (11) 
   []
1
() ( ) () BB B A A A A Xa b R b a
M
α τβ α τ =− − +− − −                (12)
  
where ( ) A A BB AABB M bR R RR β ββ β =+ + .  
  Consider the pricing game at given capacities. Solving the first-order 
























                     (13)  
A similar expression is derived for B. Since the first term on the right hand side is the 
marginal external cost of congestion, this states that the toll will exceed the marginal 
congestion cost. This has been interpreted as saying that congestion generates power, 
in the sense that it allows revenue maximizing operators to raise tolls: in a parallel 
structure, a higher toll in A raises congestion in the competing region B, making 
region A more attractive (Verhoef et al. (1996), Van Dender (2005)). Note that 
investment and congestion now have different effects on tolling behaviour, depending 
on where the investment takes place.  
  Using the expression for  A X  (see equation (4)) in (13), the toll reaction 
function for region A is readily obtained as: 
  










                 (14) 
where ( ) ( ) A BB A A B ZR a b β αα α =− + −  is a function of demand and cost parameters. 
It follows that the reaction function is upward sloping; moreover, both its slope and its 
intercept explicitly depend on capacity in the competing region. This contrasts with 
the serial case analyzed before.  
  Solving the reaction function and its counterpart for region B for the Nash 




2( ) ( )
(3 4 )( )
NE A BB B
A
BB












2( ) ( )
(3 4 )( )
NE BA A A
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AA








                   (16) 
Simple differentiation of the Nash equilibrium tolls with respect to the  i R  shows that 
higher capacity in any given region induces both regions to reduce tolls. We have:  










In other words, a less congestible parallel network leads both competing authorities to 
reduce their tolls.   
  Unlike in the serial case, results for the capacity game are not straightforward. 
The dependency of tolls on capacities implies that the reaction functions in capacities 
implied by the first-order condition of the first-stage of the game, viz.  














are highly non-linear. It  is shown in De Borger and Van Dender (2006) that this 
reaction function is plausibly downward sloping but that the nonlinearity implies the 
possibility of multiple equilibria. In fact, they show that asymmetric outcomes are 
more likely when unit capacity costs are low and/or structural transit demand is 
relatively inelastic. The interpretation of such an asymmetric equilibrium is quite 
intuitive. One region invests highly in capacity but also charges high tolls, so that 
congestion is low. The competing region provides much less infrastructure but also 
charges low tolls, so that congestion is much higher. Endogenously, toll and capacity 
competition induce regions to offer distinct packages, implying different ‘quality’ 
levels at different ‘prices’.     
 
3.3. Zero local demands: summary and conclusion. 
 
  Tentative conclusions for the simple cases without local traffic are 
summarized in Table 3. First, toll reaction functions and capacity reaction functions 
have opposite signs in serial and parallel settings, as could be expected. Second, serial 
competition implies that toll and capacity decisions are independent, unlike for the 
parallel case. For the latter network structure, higher capacity in any given region 
induces both regions to reduce tolls. Third, in the serial network, double 
marginalization is likely to yield higher tolls on transit than in a parallel structure.   15
Finally, the parallel case may result in asymmetric equilibria even for the simple set-
up considered above.  
 
  Parallel links   Serial links 
Toll reaction 
























Impact of capacity 
increase in A on 
tolls   















































Table 3: Characteristics of reaction functions and Nash equilibrium in the case of  
zero local transport  
 
 
4. Tax and capacity competition in transport networks: some general 
theoretical findings 
 
  In this section we extend and summarize the main theoretical findings on tax 
and capacity competition in parallel and serial networks for the more realistic case 
with both local and transit demand on each link. As we will see, many, but not all, of 
the results summarized in Table 3 for the case with zero local demand will continue to 
hold. The findings reported in this section come from different sources. First, optimal 
toll results at given capacities were derived for the parallel network case in De 
Borger, Proost, Van Dender (2005). Second, both toll and capacity competition in a 
serial corridor were studied in De Borger, Dunkerley and Proost (2006a). Third, for 
the purpose of the current paper we extended the analysis for the parallel case to 
incorporate capacity choices, using the same methodology as in the serial setting. 
  Since we limit the discussion here to a summary of the main findings, we refer 
to the papers mentioned for more details on their derivation. We proceed in several 
steps. We first briefly discuss the effects of tolls and capacities on the reduced-form   16
demands for local and transit transport. These demands are the solution of the user 
equilibrium conditions (1) and (2) as a function of all tolls and capacities in both 
regions. We then briefly discuss findings on the toll reaction functions in parallel and 
serial networks, and we report on what can be learned about strategic capacity 
choices.  
 
4.1. The effect of tolls and capacities on the demand for local and transit 
transport 
 
  In tables 4a and 4b we summarize the results that describe the effects of tolls 
and capacity increases on the equilibrium demands for local and transit transport 
under both a parallel and serial setting (De Borger et al. (2005, 2006a)). Note that we 
assume interior solutions throughout; in the parallel case, this implies that both links 
are used in equilibrium.    
  Our findings are plausible and easily summarized. First, although all own 
price effects are obviously negative, cross price effects depend in an intuitive way on 
network structure; routes are substitutes or complements depending on network 
design. For example, a toll on transit in region A raises transit demand in a parallel 
setting because transit shifts from A to B. Moreover, this in turn raises congestion in 
B and hence reduces demand for local traffic in that region. In a serial setting, 
however, higher tolls on transit in A reduce transit demand throughout the corridor; 
the decline in congestion in B then raises demand for local transport in that region. 
Similarly, in a parallel setting, raising local tolls in A attracts transit to A and hence 
reduces transit demand in B. It therefore raises local demand in B because of 
declining congestion. In a serial network the same toll increase in A raises transit 
through B and hence reduces local demand there. 
  Second, consider the impact of capacity investments on demand. Again, 
results differ according to network design. Capacity investments in A raise demand 
for both transit and local demand in A, but the impact on demand in B depends on 
network structure. A serial setting yields more transit through B and hence less local 
demand there; a parallel setting shifts transit from B to A and raises local demand in B 
because of lower congestion.   17
 
  Effect on 
transit 
demand in A 
Effect on 
transit 
demand in B 
Effect on local 
demand in A 
Effect on local 
demand in B 
Toll on transit 
in A 
<0 >0 >0 <0 
Toll on local 
demand in A 
>0 <0 <0 >0 
Uniform toll 
on both local 
demand and 
transit in A 
<0 >0 <0 <0 
Capacity 
increase in A 
>0 <0 >0 >0 
Table 4a: Demand effects of tolls and capacity investment in parallel networks (effects of toll or 




  Effect on 
transit 
demand in A 
and B  
Effect on local 
demand in A 
Effect on local 
demand in B 
Toll on transit in 
A 
<0 >0  >0 
Toll on local 
demand in A 
>0 <0  <0 
Uniform toll on 
local demand and 
transit in A 
<0 <0  >0 
Capacity increase 
in A 
>0 >0  <0 
Table 4b: Demand effects of tolls and capacity investment in serial networks  
(effects of toll or capacity changes in one region on demand, holding all other tolls  
and capacities in both regions constant; note that transit demand in A equals  
that in B by definition) 
 
 
4.2. Strategic tolling behaviour  
 
  In this sub-section we summarize what can be learnt about the tolling 
behaviour of countries under different network structures. We first describe the 
optimal toll rules in a given region, at given capacities and for given tolls set by the 
other region. Next we describe the characteristics of the toll reaction functions. We 
assume throughout that each regional government maximizes consumer surplus for its   18
local users plus all tax revenues generated on local and transit demand, net of 
investment costs associated with capacity provision. For example, in the case of 
differentiated tolls region A maximizes its objective function, given by (3), with 
respect to  , A A t τ . Note that this optimization problem is the same for parallel and serial 
network settings; as argued before; what differs is the demand structure. Moreover, 
the generalisation to the cases of uniform tolls or local tolls only is obvious.   
  The optimal toll rules are derived in De Borger et al. (2005, 2006a). 
Interestingly, they are the same for parallel and serial settings, although (see below) 
they have very different practical implications depending on the network structure. 
The toll rules imply tax exporting behaviour: if regions can differentiate tolls between 
local and transit demand, then they will toll transit at a higher rate than local demand; 
if tolls are restricted to be uniform, then the optimal toll positively depends on the 
importance of transit. Moreover, the use of local tolls strongly depends on the 
instruments available. If transit can be tolled, then tolls on local traffic are set higher 
than the local marginal external congestion cost in order to reduce congestion on the 
local link and hence indirectly attract more transit (tax competition for transit). If, 
however, local tolls are the only instrument, then these tolls are set below local 
marginal external cost. The reason is that by doing so regions reduce transit demand; 
the latter generates congestion and does not contribute to welfare nor tax revenues.  
  There is some scarce empirical evidence that supports these theoretical 
predictions. For example, Nash (2005) reports very high rail rates in Switzerland and 
in former communist countries of the EU (e.g., Slovakia), pointing at double 
marginalization as a possible explanation
4. His findings also suggest a relation 
between the share of transit and the level of infrastructure charges on European rail 
links. Moreover, he warns that levels of charges may be prohibitively high for 
international traffic involved in transit of a country.  
  The optimal toll rules for a given region implicitly describe the toll reaction 
functions. To illustrate the importance of network structure for strategic behaviour by 
regions in the simplest possible way, it is instructive to return to the case of linear 
demands and costs, presented in section 3 above. In the serial case, and focusing on 
                                                 
4 Also see Bassanini and Pouyet (2005). Interestingly, Nash (2005) argues that EU-Directive 2001/14 
for rail is to be interpreted as not allowing discrimination by different operators for a given type of 
traffic, but that discrimination by one operator for different types of traffic does seem to be allowed. In 
other words, toll discrimination is not just theoretically interesting, but may have practical relevance.   19
differentiated tolls for local and transit transport, the reaction functions can then be 
shown to have the following structure (De Borger et al. (2006a)):    





A AB B cz t
τ ττ =− −                    (17) 





A AB B tc L z L t τ =+ +                  (18) 
where the parameters  A c
τ , 
t
A c ,  1
B z and 
A L  are all functions of demand and cost 
parameters. Moreover,  1
B z  (where  1
B z  <0 and less than one in absolute value) gives 
the effect of an exogenous increase in transit transport in region B on the demand for 
local transport in that region. Finally,  10
A L − << . Note that in the absence of local 
demand these expressions are consistent with the results described in section 3. To see 
this, compare equation (17) with (6).  
  The interpretation of the effect of toll changes in region B on optimal tolls in 
A is then clear. We find that an increase in the transit tax in B induces region A to 
optimally reduce both its transit tax and the tax on local traffic. The higher tax on 
transit in B reduces transit demand and hence reduces congestion in A. The optimal 
response in A is therefore to reduce both taxes. Similarly, a higher local tax in B 
induces region A to optimally raise transit as well as local taxes in A. The higher local 
tax in B reduces congestion in B, and attracts more transit. This also raises congestion 
in A. Therefore, country A raises its tax rates on all traffic on its territory.  
  As argued before, the structure of the reaction functions bears some close 
resemblance to well known results in industrial organisation. For example, it implies 
that an increase in the transit toll in one region by one unit raises the total toll on 
transit for the whole trajectory by less than one unit. This well known result on the 
pricing behaviour of successive monopolies (see Bresnahan and Reiss (1985), Tirole 
(1993)) persists when adding local transport. 
  The structure of the reaction functions for the parallel links are quite similar. 






AA B B dz t
τ τδ τ δ =− −                                       (19) 





AA B B td K z K t δτ δ =+ +                                 (20)       
where the coefficients depend on demand and cost parameters and:    20
   0, 0 1 δδ < <<  
10
A K − <<  
  The interpretation of the effects of changes in foreign taxes on optimal local 
taxes in A is then clear. We find that an increase in the transit tax abroad induces 
country A to optimally adjust both its transit tax and the tax on local traffic upwards, 
but that the impact on the transit tax is larger than the effect on the local tax. Why is 
this the case? The higher tax on transit in B reduces transit there and raises transit 
demand in A. This increases local congestion in A. The optimal response in A is 
therefore to raise both taxes. Similarly, a higher local tax in B induces country A to 
optimally reduce transit as well as local taxes in A. The higher local tax in B reduces 
congestion in B, and makes B relatively more – and A relatively less – attractive to 
transit traffic. This also reduces both congestion and tax revenues in A. To 
compensate, country A raises its tax rate on local traffic; this reduces congestion but 
raises tax revenues.  
  What do we learn from these reaction function specifications? First, 
comparing parallel and serial cases, we see that the slopes of reaction functions are of 
opposite signs, as one would expect. Second, in setting transit tolls regions react more 
strongly to toll changes abroad in serial networks than in parallel settings. This 
follows from  1 δ < . It implies that one expects more tax competition and tax 
exporting behaviour on serial networks than on parallel networks. Third, the strongest 
interaction between regions is in the transit tolls. Changes in local tolls have much 
less effect on other regions. In fact, the strategic interaction in local tolls is almost 
negligible. Economically, it makes sense. Local tolls only affect local tolls abroad via 
their impact on congestion and the shift in transit to the other region but there is no 
direct tax competition as in the case of transit. 
 
4.3. Capacity reaction functions     
 
  Unfortunately, few general theoretical results could be derived on the nature of 
capacity competition, largely due to the complexity of the dependency of Nash 
equilibrium tolls on capacities in both regions. This dependence was already observed 
for the parallel network structure in the case of zero local demand, studied in section 
3. Moreover, in the serial setting, the independence of Nash equilibrium tolls and   21
capacities that was observed in the case of zero local demand does not hold when this 
assumption is relaxed.  
  However, the scarce theoretical results as well as findings based on numerical 
work (see, among others, De Borger et al. (2006a), De Borger and Van Dender 
(2006)) lead to the following predictions
5. First, consider the effect of capacity 
changes at the first stage on the Nash equilibrium tolls at the second stage. In a serial 
setting, capacity increases in region A reduce Nash equilibrium tolls on both transit 
and local demand in A. In B it will lead to more congestion and therefore higher tolls. 
In a parallel network, we see the opposite. A capacity increase in A leads to toll 
reductions there because of lower congestion but congestion in B will also be reduced, 
hence reducing tolls. Second, consider capacity reaction functions. In serial networks, 
capacities are strategic complements: capacity reaction functions are plausibly upward 
sloping. More capacity in A raises congestion in B, inducing this region to raise 
capacity as well. Parallel settings imply, on the contrary, that capacities are likely to 
be strategic substitutes: capacity reaction functions are plausibly downward sloping.  
More capacity in a region attracts transit from the other region, reducing the capacity 
requirements in that region. So the predictions reported in Table 3 for the case of zero 
local demand are likely to generalize to the situation with both transit and local 
demand. 
 
5. Numerical illustration 
  This section presents some illustrative results based on numerical simulation 
analysis that allow us to compare the nature and extent of toll and capacity 
competition on simple serial and parallel networks. We first describe the calibration 
of the numerical illustration (subsection 5.1). Then we proceed to discuss the price 
setting and investment behaviour in the serial and parallel case. We consecutively 
analyse the efficiency of the zero toll Nash equilibrium capacity choices (subsection 
5.2), the desirability of allowing the tolling of transit by differentiated or uniform tolls 
(subsection 5.3), and the welfare effects if only local transport can be tolled 
(subsection 5.4). Finally, we report results for the coordinated solution that would be 
welfare maximizing from the viewpoint of a federal authority that coordinates the 
                                                 
5 Moreover, note that they are corroborated by the empirical findings reported below. 
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whole network and, hence, avoids toll and capacity competition between regions. 
Throughout the focus is on the importance of the different network structures for the 
results. 
 
5.1 Calibration of the reference case 
 
  We have chosen a numerical example with a maximum of comparability 
between the parallel and the serial network. For the sake of clarity, we limit ourselves 
to the symmetric case with two identical regions.  The calibration process is illustrated 
using Table 5. The model is initially calibrated for the serial case with zero tolls. As 
explained in more detail below, capacity is chosen such that it indeed reflects a Nash 
equilibrium for the zero toll case in each region. As is clear from the table, we use the 
same local demand functions (and values of time), the same congestion technology 
and the same cost of capacity in the parallel and serial case. However, since the transit 
flows pass through two regions in the serial case and only through one region in the 
parallel case, the transit demand functions differ for the two cases: this is necessary 
because we want the total flows inside each country to be comparable for identical 
capacities. Note that the calibration procedure implies that the first-best federal 
optimum is identical for the serial and parallel network structures (see below). This is 
a desirable feature in view of the comparative nature of this paper.  
  The calibration process starts with the reference data for the serial case given 
in the lower left part of table 5. We choose local and transit flows that have a similar 
order of magnitude; moreover, reference time costs are of the same order of 
magnitude as the non time costs. The level of congestion in the reference equilibrium 
was such that the time costs were 50% higher than at zero traffic. This yields a 
generalised cost and a time cost in the reference equilibrium, as well as two points for 
the congestion function, so that the intercept α and the slope (which at constant 
capacity equals βR) can be determined. To complete the calibration of the demand 
functions, we have chosen an elasticity of local demand equal to -0.3. Finally, 
reference capacity was fixed at 2000. Since R  is inverse capacity this, together with 
the slope of the congestion function, determines β. As suggested before, to facilitate 
the comparison with the other regimes that will be studied, it is assumed that the 
chosen capacity (2000) in the zero toll serial case is indeed the Nash equilibrium for 
each of the regions. This is done by determining the cost of capacity extension K in    23
such a way that this indeed holds. This completes the calibration of the serial network 
case.  
  For the parallel case, we use the same parameters except for the transit 
demand function; it has a steeper slope in order to have comparable flows on the 
different segments of the network. The calibration leads to the reference demands, 
generalized prices and capacities reported in the lower right part of Table 5.     24
 
 Serial  Parallel 
Demand function local  Y Pc d Y =− , where c=283.6 and d=0.17 
Demand function transit  X Pa b X =− , where 
a=567.1 and b=0.33 






PX X =− +   
Congestion function  ii i CR V α β = +  for  , iA B = , where  ii i VXY =+ , and 
34.3 α =  and  23.9 β =  
Cost of capacity   K=18.7  
Reference equilibrium = 
the zero toll equilibrium at 
optimal capacity 
Y = 1300,  65
Y P =  
X = 1300, 130
X P =  
Capacity (=1/R) = 2000 
 
Y = 1206,  81.3
Y P =  
X = 1206, 81.3
X P =  
Capacity (=1/R) = 1229 
Table 5. Calibration of the numerical example (endogenous elements are in 
italic)  
 
5.2 How efficient is capacity competition in the zero toll reference case?  
 
  The most relevant information on the results for different regimes and for the 
two different network structures are summarized in Table 6. First consider the no-toll 
case; as noted before, this case has been used for the calibration and serves as 
reference here. We see that there remain, both in the serial and parallel networks, 
important marginal external congestion costs that are not internalised. For example, in 
the serial case the local and global marginal external congestion costs equal 15.6 and 
31.1, respectively. Note that the term ‘local’ refers to the marginal external congestion 
cost imposed on local users; ‘global’ refers to the overall cost imposed on local users 
and on transit. An important property of the serial case that was referred to in the 
theoretical sections of the paper but that is not apparent from this table, is that the 
capacity levels are strategic complements: whenever one region increases capacity, 
the other has an interest to follow in order to cope with the increased transit flow. In 
the parallel case, capacities in the two regions are strategic substitutes. We see that, 
although flows would be identical if capacity would be identical, the Nash 
equilibrium has a much lower level of capacity. Indeed, whenever a region (say A)   25
increases its capacity it attracts extra transit from the other region (say B). Making 
route A initially cheaper results in arbitrage over the network that produces strong 
disincentives to increase capacity in the first place.  
 
 
5.3 Is allowing differentiated tolling welfare improving?  
 
  Economists have often advocated the use of tolling instruments to cope with 
non-internalized congestion. In principle, one can allow differentiated (between local 
and transit transport) or uniform tolling. Both cases are considered in Table 6, for the 
serial and parallel network structure. In the serial case, the Nash equilibrium results 
show that allowing regions to toll all transport on their network (whether by 
differentiated or uniform tolls) implies a decline in total welfare, i.e., it makes things 
worse compared to the no tolling case. Overall welfare decreases by 13% to 20% in 
the uniform and differentiated cases, respectively. Note that overall welfare reported 
in the table refers to the welfare of all network users; it includes both the welfare of 
local and of transit users. The reason for the welfare decline is related to the double 
marginalisation behaviour referred to before. It shows up because the two 
‘monopolists’ do not coordinate their price setting of transit transport. As a 
consequence, we find very high margins on transit in the differentiated toll case; they 
are well above the marginal external congestion cost. In the uniform case it results in 
high tolls on all transport on the network. These high prices allow savings on capacity 
costs: optimal capacity is substantially lower than in the no toll reference situation. 
However, these savings do not compensate for the losses in consumer surplus, 
especially for transit users.  
  In the parallel case, we find the opposite results. Introducing tolling allows the 
low investment incentives of the no toll case to be overcome and this gives much 
higher capacity levels (about 2180 compared to 1229 in the zero toll reference). 
Optimal tolls are positive but, as predicted by the theory presented before, transit tolls 
are much lower than in the serial case; this holds both for differentiated and uniform   26
tolls. The consequence of much lower Nash equilibrium tolls on transit implies that in 
the parallel case overall welfare rises substantially
 6.   
  Note that, except for the toll levels themselves, differentiated tolling and 
uniform tolling generate very similar results in the parallel case. In the serial case, 
however, toll discrimination against transit is a more important problem; it can be 
mitigated somewhat by imposing uniform tolling.  
 
5.4. Welfare effects of tolling local traffic only 
 
  Consider the results for the case where for whatever reason transit remains un-
tolled. When only local traffic can be tolled, one obviously rules out tax exporting. 
Contrary to the cases where transit was tolled, this implies that on a serial network 
small welfare improvements are now attained compared to no tolling at all. The toll is 
slightly below local marginal external cost, and the toll somewhat reduces demand so 
that a lower capacity is optimal compared to the zero toll case (1945 compared to 
2000).  In the parallel case the welfare benefits are positive as well, because one can 
achieve a better use of the network by the local traffic and save some capacity costs. 
However, as only part of the traffic is actually controlled, the welfare gains that can 
be achieved remain very small. Also, observe that the optimal local toll is smaller than 
in the serial case. The reason is that the purpose of the local toll is to indirectly control 
transit as well as local traffic. Reducing transit by local tolls requires higher tolls in 
the serial case because transit demand through any given region is only affected via 
congestion increases. The reaction of transit is stronger in the parallel case because an 
alternative route is available, unlike in a serial corridor.  
 
5.5. The ideal solution for a federal government: the first-best  
 
  Finally, we move away from tax and capacity competition between the two 
hypothetical regions. Instead, we assume that the whole network is under the control 
                                                 
6 Even if the capacity levels would be kept at the zero toll case (not shown in table 6), we found that 
allowing tolling would be beneficial. The gains of a better use of a given capacity are important, and 
abuse of a monopoly position by one region is limited by the Bertrand competition with the other 
region.  
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of one ‘federal’ government; it decides on tolls and capacity investments for the 
network by maximizing overall welfare for all users of the whole network.  
  The results are reported in the final two columns of Table 6. First, at this 
federal optimum tolls are set equal to the global marginal external congestion cost that 
takes account of the time losses imposed on both transit and on local traffic. Note that, 
although tolls can in principle be differentiated, there is no need to do so; the tolls on 
local and transit transport are equal at the optimum. Second, capacity levels are 
chosen simultaneously in each region such that the marginal cost of capacity 
extension equals the marginal benefit for all transport, transit and local. Third, note 
that except for rounding errors in the calculations, the optimum solutions for the 
parallel and serial networks are identical. This is due to the fact that the zero toll cases 
for both network types were calibrated using the same local demand functions, the 
same values of time, the same congestion functions and the same costs of extra 
capacity. Finally, given that the federal optimum yields identical tolls, capacities, 
demands and overall welfare levels for the two network types, the welfare 
improvement in the parallel case is much more important than on the serial network. 
This follows from the lower welfare level in the zero toll case for the parallel network.  
  Summarizing the first-best outcome, marginal external cost pricing and 
optimal capacity choice for the network as a whole yields much higher benefits in a 
parallel structure than in a serial setting. Note that the welfare improvements, even for 
the parallel case, seem rather modest: some 15% compared to the reference situation. 
This is however due to the fact that the reference itself was calibrated such that it 
corresponds to the Nash equilibrium with zero tolls but optimal capacity choice. Table 6. Results from serial and parallel networks -  symmetric model with 50% transit, tolls and capacity 
optimal       
Transit share in No tolls system is 50%. The distinction between countries is eliminated because results are symmetric.            
                    
 









        serial parallel Serial parallel serial parallel serial  parallel  serial  parallel   
 Local demand  Trips  1300 1206 1219 1184  732  1131 1215  1149  1233  1232   
 Transit demand  Trips  1300 1206  396  1122  732  1131 1301  1207  1233  1232   
 Trip volume (country)  Trips  2600 2411 1616 2306 1465 2261 2516  2355  2467  2465   
 Local MEC  Euro/Trip  15,6 23,5 16,8 13,0 10,8 12,4 14,9  22,8  10,6  10,6   
 Global MEC  Euro/Trip  31,1 46,9 22,3 25,3 21,7 24,8 31,0  46,8  21,1  21,2   
 Local Toll  Euro/Trip  0 0,0  22,3  25,3  104,7  34,7 14,4 9,7  21,1  21,2   
 Transit Toll  Euro/Trip  0 0,0  160,4  35,6  104,7  34,7 0,0 0,0  21,1  21,2   
 Capacity Trips  2000 1229 1732 2179 1618 2179 1945  1205  2791  2778   
 Local CS  Euro  141779 121929 124726 117517  45011  107257 123815  110729  127602  127403   
 Tax revenue (country)  Euro  0 0  90793  69938  153333  78410  17536  11129  52160  52318   
 Overall welfare  Euro  492348 441783 392658 504750 426209 504402 493956  442952  510409  510407   
 
Welfare change compared 
to the case of no tolls  % 
0 0  -20,25  14,25  -13,43  14,17 0,33 0,26  3,67  15,53 
 
                           
5.6. Summary of the numerical comparison  
 
  In Tables 7a and 7b we summarize the main implications of the numerical 
findings. We observe clear differences in the extent and the nature of tax competition 
(very severe in the serial case) and capacity competition (very severe in the parallel 
case). Moreover, welfare benefits differ according to network structure.   
 
Table 7a: Summary of findings serial case (% changes are relative to the 
reference case without tolling)  






Transit toll  Conclusion 
First-best federal 
optimum 




-20.25 -13  Toll  much 
larger than 
MECC 
Lower capacity and very 
high transit tolls; severe 





-13.43 -19  Toll  much 
larger than 
MECC 
Lower capacity and high 




Toll on local 
demand only 
0.33  -3  Toll  zero  Lower capacity because 
it mainly benefits transit 
 
 
Table 7b: Summary of findings parallel network (% changes are relative to the 
reference case without any tolling)  






Transit toll  Conclusion 
First-best federal 
optimum 
+15.53  +125  Toll=MECC Much higher capacity 
and positive tolls 
Nash toll 
discrimination 




Much higher capacity 
and higher transit tolls; 
tolling raises welfare 
Nash uniform 
toll 




Much higher capacity 
and higher transit tolls; 
tolling raises welfare 
Toll on local 
demand only 
0.26  -2  Toll  zero  Lower capacity because 
it mainly benefits transit   30
6. Conclusions 
 
  The purpose of this paper was to provide a theoretical and numerical 
comparison of the toll and capacity competition to be expected on serial and parallel 
transport networks when regional governments set user charges and determine 
capacities. Although the networks were very simple, some interesting results could be 
derived. When deciding on transit tolls regions react more strongly to toll changes 
abroad on serial networks than in parallel settings. Moreover, tolls on transit are much 
higher in serial than in parallel settings, reflecting less elastic transit demand and 
double marginalisation. We further found that capacities are strategic complements in 
serial settings but substitutes in parallel networks. On a serial corridor, whenever one 
region increases capacity, the other has an interest to follow in order to cope with the 
increased transit flow. In the parallel case, we see the opposite, resulting in lower 
Nash equilibrium levels of capacity. Arbitrage between routes acts as a strong 
disincentive to increase capacity in this case.  
  The welfare effects of allowing tolling of transit are drastically different 
depending on the network structure. In the serial case, the results show that allowing 
regions to toll all transport on their network (whether by differentiated or uniform 
tolls) implies a decline in total welfare, i.e., it makes things worse compared to no 
tolling at all. Compared to the zero toll case, we found that overall welfare decreased 
by 13% to 20% for uniform and differentiated tolls, respectively. The reason for the 
welfare decline is related to the double marginalisation behaviour referred to before. It 
shows up because the two ‘monopolists’ do not coordinate their price setting of transit 
transport. As a consequence, we find very high margins on transit in the differentiated 
toll case; they are well above the marginal external congestion cost. These high prices 
allow savings on capacity costs: optimal capacity is substantially lower than in the no 
toll reference situation. However, these savings do not compensate for the losses in 
consumer surplus, especially for transit users. In the parallel case, we find the 
opposite results. Introducing tolling allows the low investment incentives to be 
overcome in comparison with a situation where regions do not toll transit at all, 
yielding higher capacity levels. In combination with much lower Nash equilibrium 
tolls on transit than in the serial setting, this implies that in the parallel case overall 
welfare substantially rises when regions are allowed to toll all traffic. Note that, if   31
only local transport can be tolled, there is a welfare increase on both types of 
networks. However, as only part of the traffic is actually controlled, the welfare gains 
that can be achieved remain very small.  
  We also found that, in a federal optimum in which one government decides on 
tolls and capacity investments for the whole network, tax and capacity competition 
can be avoided. At the federal optimum, tolls are set equal to the global marginal 
external congestion cost that takes account of the time losses imposed on both transit 
and on local traffic. Note that, although tolls can in principle be differentiated, there is 
no need to do so; the tolls on local and transit transport are equal at the optimum. 
Capacity would rise compared to the no toll equilibrium. However, marginal external 
cost pricing and optimal capacity choice for the network as a whole yields much 
higher benefits in a parallel structure than in a serial setting. 
  This paper has clear policy implications for the regulation of user fees by the 
European Commission and for the European policy on subsidising investments in 
infrastructure (e.g., the TEN-T axes). The Commission is actually capping the user 
tolls on motorways to the average infrastructure costs; the main motivation for this 
was the potential abuse of monopoly power. Our analysis suggests that it is indeed 
very damaging for European welfare if the EU were to let individual countries freely 
decide on tolls on the links of the serial TEN’s they control. From this perspective 
restricting the tolls countries can charge is good policy. However, although restricting 
tolls seems indeed justified, the tolls should be allowed to reflect external congestion 
costs and not be based on average infrastructure costs. Moreover, our analysis of 
capacity decisions on transport networks where transit can not be tolled point to 
capacities being too low. This should be an important element in a federal 
infrastructure subsidy program. The results suggest that it might be a good idea to 
relate the provision of subsidies to the importance of transit flows and to the 
introduction of marginal social cost pricing.   
    We conclude our analysis by drawing attention to three caveats. First we 
assumed constant returns to scale in capacity extension. For some modes, such as 
roads and airports, this is considered reasonable; but for rail and inland waterways 
decreasing average costs are probably present. In the latter case, mainly the modelling 
of the capacity decisions needs to be adjusted and this may give rise to corner 
solutions (see De Borger, Dunkerley, Proost, 2006b). The second caveat is that we 
only examined proportional pricing solutions. It is well known that two-part pricing,   32
and more generally non linear pricing, can extract a larger share of the user surplus. 
Non-linear pricing exists (Eurovignettes or motorway vignette to cross Switzerland), 
but in our model setting it would require a specification of the different user classes 
and their demand functions to reach firm conclusions. Finally, we assumed a 
straightforward objective function for the regional government and a simple non 
cooperative behavioural setting to derive conclusions. It remains to be tested whether 
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